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Abstract—This paper presents the economic rationale for treating
Common Goods for Health (CGH) as priorities for public interven-
tion. We use the concept of market failure as a central argument for
identifying CGH and apply cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) as
a normative tool to prioritize CGH interventions in public finance
decisions. We show that CGH are consistent with traditional lists of
public health core functions but cannot be identified separately
from non-CGH activities in such lists. We propose a public finance
decision tree, adapted from existing health economics tools, to
identify CGH activities within the set of cost-effective interventions
for the health sector. We test the framework by applying it to the
2018 Disease Control Priority (DCP) list of interventions recom-
mended for public funding and find that less than 10% of cost-
effective interventions unconditionally qualify as CGH, while
another two-thirds may or may not qualify depending on context
and form. We conclude that while CEA can be used as a tool to
prioritize CGH, the scarcity of such analyses for CGH interventions
may be partly responsible for the lack of priority given to them. We
encourage further research to address methodological and resource
challenges to assessing the cost-effectiveness of CGH intervention
packages, in particular those involving large investments and long-
term benefits.
INTRODUCTION
In this series of papers, the concept of Common Goods for
Health (CGH) is proposed as a new construct born out of the
observed failures exposed by Ebola, SARS, Zika, and other
communicable diseases (CD) as well as by other health and
environmental risk factors explored further in this special
issue. The previous article in the special issue (by Yazbeck
and Soucat) defined CGH as a cluster of feasible
Keywords: common goods for health, cost-effectiveness analysis, disease
control priorities, market failure
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interventions exhibiting two fundamental characteristics: (i)
market failures due to their public good nature or the large
health externalities they generate; and (ii) strong potential
impact on human life.1 It explained the need to adequately
recognize and finance such services, which are historically
underfunded within the health sector, exposing human life to
large avoidable losses.
The purpose of this paper is to set out the rationale for
public funding of CGH based on economic principles, and to
provide a normative framework, based on standard economic
tools, that can be used to identify and prioritize CGH. The
framework is applied to existing public health and disease
control priority lists to understand the extent to which CGH
are included in these lists and potentially prioritized for
funding. Of course, we do not claim that the economic
perspective is the only legitimate way of framing CGH.
Rather, we examine the consequences of adopting
a normative economic approach towards prioritization,
acknowledging that many other perspectives—as reflected
in the other papers in this series—are likely to influence real-
world decisions.
We first introduce the basic economic rationale for fund-
ing CGH with public funds and discuss how cost-
effectiveness analysis (CEA) can be used to establish public
financing priorities. The next section examines the extent to
which CGH are included in existing public health frame-
works and whether such frameworks are capable of distin-
guishing between CGH and non-CGH interventions to
establish funding priorities. An empirical section then pre-
sents a public health financing decision tool and applies it to
the list of cost-effective interventions in the latest edition of
Disease Control Priorities (DCP3).2 The concluding section
discusses the limitations of the analysis and proposes some
directions for future work.
FUNDING CGH, THE ECONOMIC RATIONALE
Public finance principles provide a case for prioritizing
public actions and resources based on the notion of market
failures (i.e. conditions under which conventional markets
fail to produce socially optimal levels of a good or
service).a,3 The concept of market failure has been com-
monly used to argue for public financing in the health
sector.4-6
By focusing on market failure in our definition of CGH, we
do not mean to suggest that non-CGH services should be
provided by a conventional market. Other arguments beyond
market failure, such as issues of equity and the distribution of
power and wealth, offer compelling reasons for not relying on
conventional markets to provide personal health services.
Indeed, these concerns are a central focus of universal health
coverage (UHC), which has the effect of redistributing
resources from the rich and the healthy to the poor and the
sick. Such considerations are a core objective for all govern-
ments but lie outside the definition of CGHs and therefore the
scope of this paper. We also do not consider market failures
that arise under any form of health insurance, whether pub-
licly or privately financed, for example, in the form of moral
hazard and adverse selection. Health insurance market fail-
ures relate largely to personal services, putting them outside
the scope of this paper and the special issue overall.
To understand the role that the concept of market failure
plays in defining CGH, it is useful to review the principal
mechanisms that lead to such failures. Market failures are
usually discussed under four broad headings3:
Public goods: In the purest form, public goods are defined
as goods or services for which utilization is “non-rival” (one
person’s use does not reduce use by others) and from which
users cannot be excluded (regardless of whether or not they
have contributed financially).
Externalities: Some of the benefits (or costs) of the ser-
vice extend beyond the immediate user, but are not reflected
in the price of the service to the user.
Information asymmetries: Potential users do not have
access to relevant information that would help them make
optimal use of the service.
Natural monopoly: High fixed costs, relative to the size of
the market, mean that provision by a single entity is more
efficient than by multiple producers.
These characteristics give rise to a “market failure”
because a good or service that would be socially beneficial
is either not provided or is under-provided by a natural
market mechanism. In each case, and particularly when
large numbers of individuals are concerned, some form of
government intervention is often necessary to offset the
market failure in order to maximize social welfare.7,8 This
intervention might take the form of direct service provision,
a financial subsidy to either the supply side or the demand
side, or some sort of regulation.3,9,10
The definition of CGH focuses on market failures that
arise from public goods and large externalities, but this
does not mean that the other types of failures are ignored.
In fact, all of the categories of market failure presented
above have relevance to CGHs given that the intervention
needed to correct the failure is usually some sort of
government action, such as information provision, taxation
or regulation.
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In their purest form, public goods have two characteristics
that are likely to induce market failure: non-rivalry in con-
sumption and non-excludability.9,11 Non-rivalry describes
when consumption by one person does not reduce availabil-
ity to others; for example, information provision is often
non-rival, as consumption of information rarely depletes its
availability for other users. Exclusion is the ability to restrict
consumption, as through some rule of entitlement or charge;
for example, the reduction of air pollution in a city can
usually be enjoyed by all citizens regardless of their circum-
stances, and is therefore non-excludable. If a good is non-
rival and it is impossible to exclude users whether or not they
have contributed to its finance, it is a pure public good.b In
practice, both characteristics exist on a spectrum and are not
strictly binary in nature.3 Market failures associated with
some aspects of the two characteristics typically affect
many goods and services that are only partially rival and/or
excludable. The notion of public goods is therefore generally
extended to include goods and services that feature low
levels of rivalry or excludability.12
A fundamental reason why public goods are not provided
in an optimal form by a conventional market is the capacity
for “free riding” by users, in that utilization is possible
without payment. On the demand side, this means that
potential users may be reluctant to voluntarily fund the
service if they know they or others can free ride on its
provision. Suppliers, in turn, will be reluctant to provide
such services unless they can be assured of adequate reven-
ues from independent sources, such as governments or exter-
nal donor funds.
The issue of free riding becomes particularly relevant
when it comes to financing global CGH that involve costs
and benefits reaching beyond national borders (see articles
by Yamey and colleagues as well as Lo and colleagues in this
special issue for examples).13,14 Beyond free riding, and
even in cases when exclusion is feasible, the non-rival or
quasi non-rival nature of a public good often renders exclu-
sion inefficient, since additional benefits can be gained at no
additional cost.3
While empirical evidence indicates that markets are in
fact capable of providing some public goods, regulatory and
legal environments need to be favorable and private benefits
(including indirect benefits) need to be sufficiently large to
justify private investment.15(pp424-425)
In the health sector, interventions that may be charac-
terized as public goods include: regulation and oversight of
markets, knowledge development (including medical
research and development of protocols), disease surveil-
lance, and information dissemination. Many of these public
good interventions are in fact aimed at addressing market
failures, most notably information failures and imperfect
competition. Information failures are responsible for inade-
quate supply of and/or demand for many private goods and
services in the health sector. The typical public policy
response to such information failures is not to finance
provision but rather to address the information gap. This
may be done through activities such as health promotion
campaigns, compulsory labeling, maintenance of public
information sites, and public reporting of provider perfor-
mance, all of which are government-supported interven-
tions that potentially qualify under the CGH criteria.
Similarly, government interventions aimed to correct mar-
ket failures from natural monopolies are also potential
CGH candidates. Through proper regulation and oversight,
governments can ensure that a monopoly does not restrict
access through high prices and produces high-quality pro-
ducts in spite of the lack of competitive pressure.
Externalities arise when an individual’s decision as to
whether or not to use a service fails to take account of the
broader social consequences of that decision, whether positive
(beneficial) or negative (harmful). Externalities lead to
a market failure because private demand/supply takes into
account only private benefits. By ignoring the broader social
consequences of private decisions, externalities lead to under-
or over-provision from a social welfare perspective. The most
obvious examples of externalities in the health sector relate to
decisions concerning the prevention or early treatment of an
infectious disease that may provide additional benefits to
broader society, in the form of reduced spread of infection,
as well as creating benefits for the individual being treated.
Another example is smoking, which gives rise to a negative
externality through the health effects of passive smoking.
Externalities often occur in relation to personal goods or
services, and policy responses are therefore directed towards
changing private consumption decisions.
As in the case of public goods, market failures arising from
large externalities can be addressed through a variety or combi-
nation of public policy instruments, including financing, deliv-
ery, taxation, subsidies, mandates, information, and behavior
change interventions. A typical policy instrument in the presence
of externalities is the use of taxation (e.g., tobacco taxes) or
financial subsidies (e.g. financing contraception patches).
However, technical feasibility and the availability of cost-
effective interventions may constrain public sector responses.
282 Health Systems & Reform, Vol. 5 (2019), No. 4
ESTABLISHING FUNDING PRIORITIES USING
ECONOMIC TOOLS: COST-EFFECTIVENESS
To inform whether or not to take public action on a market
failure, and what form that action should take, economists
developed the tool of cost-benefit analysis (CBA).17,18
CBA seeks to determine whether the aggregate social
benefits of implementing an intervention outweigh the
aggregate social costs. If so, society would in principle
wish to implement the intervention in question. In practice,
it has proved immensely challenging to make CBA opera-
tional, because of the complexities of tracking all the
social consequences of a planned course of action and
expressing all costs and benefits in a common metric
(usually money). The latter is particularly difficult, con-
troversial, and subject to wide variations when valuing
health gains. Health economists have therefore developed
cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) as a more practical nor-
mative tool for comparing alternative uses of available
funds within the publicly funded health sector.19
CEA is particularly relevant when the sector is seeking to
optimize the use of resources subject to a fixed budget
constraint. It assumes the primary goal of the health system
is to improve health, and therefore seeks to promote the
maximization of health improvement with available funds.
CEA usually takes the form of a performance measure—
such as cost per disability-adjusted life year (DALY)—that
enables comparison of radically different uses of health-
sector funds using a uniform cost-effectiveness (CE) metric.
It is also possible to augment CE calculations with distribu-
tional considerations, using approaches such as extended
cost-effectiveness analysis, which disaggregates the costs
and benefits of an intervention by social group.20
In principle, all uses of health system funds can be ranked
using the chosen CE metric in order to identify the best use
of limited funds. However, that is usually infeasible given
uncertainty and ranges in CE estimates and cross-country
heterogeneity. Economists, therefore, recommend that CE
estimates for any proposed new intervention should be
gauged against a country-specific CE “threshold” that
depends on the given health system’s resources. The CE
threshold, in theory, indicates the opportunity cost of alter-
native uses of health-sector funds at the margin; projects
with a CE ratio (such as cost per DALY saved) below the
prevailing CE threshold should be accepted for implementa-
tion. The threshold levels in low- and middle-income coun-
tries (LMICs) are likely to be much lower than those enjoyed
by high-income countries because of the lower levels of
funds available, although estimation of operational threshold
levels has hitherto proved challenging.21
In all decisions based on cost-effectiveness, additional
contextual factors must also be considered, as part of
a properly informed deliberative process. But from a public
finance perspective, cost-effectiveness is a coherent theore-
tical criterion for guiding priorities for the use of public
health system funds. Note that the CE criterion can also
readily be applied to intersectoral projects. From a health
system perspective, the important consideration for such
projects remains whether the health benefits secured are
sufficient given the opportunity costs to the health system,
regardless of costs and benefits that accrue to other sectors.22
ARE CGH INCLUDED AND PRIORITIZED AS CORE
PUBLIC HEALTH FUNCTIONS?
In addition to public finance economics, the field of public
health has provided significant guidance to help countries
prioritize actions within the health sector in ways that are
consistent with the societal goal of maximizing welfare.
However, unlike in economics, a public health approach is
not derived through conceptual first principles. Instead, pub-
lic health relies on a combination of empiricism and expert
opinion to produce lists of critical functions focused on
collective and individual responsibilities in the service of
social justice and population health. We examine in this
section the extent to which a public health approach is
compatible with consideration of CGH.
A variety of lists of core public health functions, and the
corresponding responsible actors, have been published by
different organizations. (Martin-Moreno and colleagues
give a compendium of lists developed worldwide between
1994 and 2015 for use in public policy).23(pp339–40) Recent
efforts sought to combine these lists into a single interna-
tional standard, but to date, none has secured complete
agreement.16,24 While the lists may differ in the specific
actions and activities they include or in the way these actions
are clustered, the criteria for inclusion are generally based on
common broad principles, including collective responsibility,
whole population coverage, prevention orientation, socioeco-
nomic determinants and risk factors, multisectoral drivers
and approaches, and partnerships with the population.25,27
Wagstaff and Claeson’s synthesis of different lists resulted
in a list of public health responsibilities and core functions
that has the advantage of being comprehensive yet compact.6
It is presented in Table 1 with examples of notable CGH and
non-CGH interventions for each core function. All major
CGH interventions highlighted in this special issue fit within
the categories of core public health functions. A few of the
actions noted (namely those related to information, water,
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and air quality) are almost pure public goods. Others have
very large externalities and therefore also need to be con-
sidered when prioritizing public sector actions to promote
health. What becomes clear is that CGH, including
intersectoral actions such as environmental regulation, are
embraced by the conventional core public health functions
framework, and therefore should in principle be included
among options for action by decision makers.
Core public health functions Actions/Activities included Notable CGH
Non-CGH
examples
1. Policy development ● Public health regulation and enforcement.
● Evaluation and promotion of equitable access to necessary
health services.
● Assurance of the quality of personal and population-based
health services.
● Health policy formulation and planning.
● Financing and management of health services.
● Pharmaceutical policy, regulation, and enforcement.
● Health security and environmen-
tal risk national policies and
strategies
● Market signals through health
taxes
● Planning and management of
emergency response
● Health Technology Assessment
● Provider pay-
ments policy
● Digital health
policy
2. Collection and dissemination of
evidence for public health
policies/strategies/actions
● Health situation monitoring and analysis.
● Research, development, and implementation of innova-
tive public health solutions.
● Provision of information to consumers, providers, pol-
icymakers, and ﬁnanciers.
● Health information and management systems.
Research and evaluation.
● Disease surveillance
● Risk surveillance including anti-
microbial resistance (AMR),
chemicals and radiation, etc.
● Human and animal disease,
environmental, and risk (e.g.
AMR, chemicals and radiation)
surveillance
● Research, communication and
dissemination
● Actuarial
monitoring
3. Prevention and control of
disease
● Surveillance and control of risks and damages in public
health.
● Management of communicable and non-communicable
diseases.
● Health promotion.
● Behavior change interventions for disease prevention
and control.
● Social participation and empowerment of citizens in
health.
● Lessening of the impact of emergencies and disasters on
health.
● Sewage treatment and control
● Vaccination
● Vector control
● Regulation of safety of medi-
cines and medical devices
● Medical and solid waste
management
● Information
● Community engagement
● Personal
hygiene
● Self-care
● Production of
manufactured
products
4. Intersectoral action for better
health
● Environmental protection and health, including road
safety, indoor air pollution, water and sanitation and
disease vector control in infrastructure, management of
medical wastes, tobacco legislation, school health, and
education.
● Regulation of roads, energy and
food systems
● Coordination and planning of
emergency response
● Environmental regulations and
guidelines (e.g. for biodiversity
and water and air quality)
● Land use and city planning for
better health
● Production and
provision of
healthy food
● Management of
water adduction
5. Human resource development/
capacity building for public
health
● Development of policy, planning, and managerial
capacity.
● Human resources development and training in public
health.
● Community capacity building.
● Accreditation of health facil-
ities and providers
● Development of protocols and
best practice related to CGH
activities
● Capacity building related to
CGH
● Training related
to non-CGH
activities
● Incentives for
provision of
individual
services
First two columns adapted from Table 8.16(p133)
TABLE 1. Examples of CGH and Non-CGH Interventions in Public Health Core Functions
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However, the fact that CGH are indeed included as core
public health functions does not imply that they are success-
fully prioritized. Table 1 gives examples of non-CGH inter-
ventions under different core public health functions. Many
of these are essential governmental functions but do not
exhibit the public good or externality characteristics of
CGHs; thus they do not suffer from the same risk of inade-
quate prioritization. Given that there is no specific tool to
prioritize across or within core functions in the public health
framework, it may, therefore, be the case that CGH interven-
tions do not fare well when they compete with non-CGH
interventions in budget processes. In fact, the concept of core
public health functions has become very broad, including all
functions that the public health community sees as the role
of governments in early twenty-first century systems. This
role has broadly become synonymous with expanding health
coverage for all as part of the UHC agenda. As demand has
increased for broad-based public financing of personal UHC
services, CGH have not always remained as priorities.
One way to ensure that CGH fare better in the competi-
tion for public funding is to combine public health frame-
works with public economics principles. Since public
economics allows us to be selective in the types of market
failures that are most relevant for CGH (namely public goods
and large externalities), it can serve the objective of priority
setting more effectively than working only with core public
health functions. Specifically, we can start with larger lists of
core public health functions or interventions considered for
public funding; then identify CGH activities within the
applicable list and separate them from non-CGH activities
(as is done in Table 1); and finally, prioritize within CGH
interventions (or packages of interventions to address CGH)
using CEA tools. This is demonstrated in the next section.
APPLYING THE PUBLIC FINANCE DECISION
FRAMEWORK TO IDENTIFY CGH
INTERVENTIONS
We propose a modification of Musgrove’s public finance
decision framework for health to separate CGH interventions
from other public health priorities.28 We then apply the
modified framework to a widely disseminated list of inter-
ventions recommended for public funding in order to assess
the importance of CGH in such lists. The exercise also
highlights some grey areas that may motivate future refine-
ments of the framework to improve its practical application.
We focus on specific interventions rather than broader
public health functions for practical reasons. In principle, we
would wish to evaluate the entire portfolio of interventions
provided within a function, rather than individual interven-
tions, because the benefits and, more importantly, the costs
of a proposed intervention may be highly dependent on the
public health infrastructure already in place. However, CEA
has hitherto found such evaluation challenging and research
has only recently offered practical tools for adopting
a functional approach to evaluation.29
Transforming Musgrove’s Decision Tree to Focus on
CGH
Musgrove proposed a practical framework to assess whether
an intervention qualifies for public sector financing based on
nine criteria grouped in three categories: (i) economic effi-
ciency (public goods, externalities, catastrophic cost, and
cost-effectiveness); (ii) ethics (poverty, horizontal and verti-
cal equity, and the rule of rescue); and (iii) political (what
people collectively want).28 Our question is whether the
market failure criteria can be examined independently of
the welfare and equity impacts of private provision; this is
indeed possible using Musgrove’s decision tree since condi-
tions related to catastrophic costs (individual welfare issue)
and poverty status of beneficiaries (equity issue, rule of
rescue) come into consideration only after it has been estab-
lished that there are no significant externalities.c
A simplified Musgrove tree may thus be used to sort through
activities considered for public financing on the grounds that
the market fails to produce the socially optimal outcome
(Figure 1).
The identification of CGH interventions for public finan-
cing requires careful consideration of all relevant features of
the interventions, namely: whether it fits under the qualifica-
tion of public or quasi-public good (social good); whether it
permits the realization of large social externalities (in parti-
cular, it needs to provide benefits to a significant number of
people beyond the person who directly benefits from the
intervention); whether the expected effect on human health
is large; and whether greater health benefits could be
obtained using more cost-effective interventions. As dis-
cussed earlier, the fundamental rationale for using CEA
when establishing funding priorities is to prevent less cost-
effective interventions from squeezing out more cost-
effective ones. If less cost-effective interventions are funded,
the aggregate benefits to human health are lower than the
alternative use of funds. For this reason, Musgrove’s decision
tree places the CE criterion as the overarching normative
hurdle in the decision process.
In order to allow prioritization based on cost-
effectiveness, one needs to examine interventions starting
from the most cost-effective. Considering cost-effectiveness
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upfront is important if we consider that costs and benefits
are country-specific. Thus the set of cost-effective interven-
tions that can be implemented in a given country will always
be specific to the health system under scrutiny and the
aggregate amount of funding it has available. Figure 2 sum-
marizes the methodology that we use to identify and prior-
itize CGH within the list of cost-effective interventions for
health.d
Because implementation of CEA requires considerable
data, skills, and time, individual countries and donors gen-
erally depend on the availability of international research to
evaluate the health benefits and costs associated with inter-
ventions examined for public funding. Several international
organizations and national institutions have engaged in pro-
viding publicly available CEA estimates, either by producing
new estimates or reviewing and compiling results from aca-
demic research worldwide. WHO has assembled CE
evidence to identify “best-buy” interventions for non-
communicable diseases (NCDs) and to build an investment
case for public health preventive activities.30,31 The OECD
has reviewed cost and benefits of policies to address envir-
onmental health issues.26 And the UK’s National Institute for
Health Care Excellence has compiled CE analysis results for
all interventions in its guidelines.32 However, the most com-
prehensive lists of recommended health interventions
suitable for countries of different income levels based on
CE estimates are in reports produced by the DCP network.33
Such lists of cost-effective interventions compiled from
international evidence are themselves global public goods
that may be used as evidence to argue for public funding
of health-sector interventions at the national level. These
lists could, therefore, be used as a tool to promote investment
in CGH. In the following section, we assess the extent and
importance of CGH in the current version of the DCP, the
DCP3.
Identifying CGH in the DCP3 List of Interventions with
CE Estimates
We apply the methodology described above to the latest DCP3
list of recommended health-sector interventions.34,35 We
chose the list of interventions with CE estimates (ref. 1,
ch. 7) rather than the longer list of essential UHC interven-
tions (ref. 1, ch. 3) because the latter does not include CEA
estimates, which we have argued are central in public finan-
cing decision and prioritization processes. The DCP3 list is
selected over other lists of cost-effective interventions (e.g.
WHO-Choice) because it is the most recent, most compre-
hensive, and provides comparable CE estimates across inter-
ventions and disease categories. The DCP3 list is used as
FIGURE 1. Simplified Decision Tree to Inform the Decision on Financing CGH. Adapted from Musgrove (1999) with permission28
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a way to work through specific examples and document the
extent of CGH covered by current evidence, rather than as
a means to create a new ranking of cost-effective interventions
to be used in decision-making. Indeed, there are important
limitations, highlighted in the DCP3 report, concerning how
the interventions are selected. For example, CEAs carried out
for the international community may not be directly transfer-
able to a particular country context given that costs and
benefits vary across countries with varied input prices, health
risks, existing infrastructure, etc.
DCP3 examined interventions to cover six disease areas.
Their CE estimates are based on 149 published studies
checked for quality. A total of 93 interventions are included
in the DCP3 list but some differ only because different
contexts yield different CE estimates. After removing such
duplicates, we are left with 88 “unique” interventions (a few
are still similar but involve different comparators as opposed
to the “do-nothing” alternative).
In order to demonstrate the breadth of potential CGH,
each intervention is identified by disease category and by the
function it serves in health systems and policy. The com-
parators used to establish CE estimates are clearly identified
when they are not “do nothing.”e We then identify whether
the intervention fits under the public good definition or
whether it is likely to realize significant health and non-
health externalities. When designation as CGH depends on
contextual factors or on a specific form of the intervention,
we term such restrictions “qualifiers.” Depending on these
and the reported range of CE estimates, the intervention is
designated as either qualifying, not qualifying or possibly
qualifying as a cost-effective CGH intervention. Appendix 1
(online supplement) includes descriptions of the 88 interven-
tions examined and provides details about the application of
the methodology, including some notes and questions for
discussion on the fundamental characteristics of CGH.
The designation of “public good” was usually assigned to
interventions related to improving legislation (in particular
when the improvements aim to facilitate private provision
and reduce market failures such as information failures),
most knowledge development and dissemination (including
the development of guidelines and protocols), broad beha-
vior change communications and outdoor vector control
activities (such as spraying insecticides and improving
water infrastructure).
The presence of significant health externalities (large
social benefits) included interventions for control of CD
(in endemic situations), some worker development (training),
and education and knowledge dissemination activities. In
determining whether an intervention qualified as CGH
under the “large externality” criterion, we questioned
FIGURE 2. Decision Diagram to Extract CGH from Lists of Cost-Effective Health-Sector Interventions
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whether the benefits generated would extend to others well
beyond the direct recipient. For example, when considering
treating water, there are possible interventions at the level of
the community and at the level of homes. The intervention
“Household water treatment in LICs,” included in DCP3 as
a cost-effective intervention for children (Figure 7.4 in
Horton, 2018),35 is described as chlorination for safe drink-
ing water. Personal water systems are generally restricted to
use by one household, with few immediate externalities, so it
is defined as a private good that may qualify for public
financing on poverty/equity grounds but not as CGH. On
the other hand, building or upgrading a community rural or
urban water system, also included in the same list, qualifies
as a cost-effective CGH intervention.
Restrictions placed on the designation as CGH (quali-
fiers) are presented in Table A1 (online supplement). CGH
qualifiers are either context-specific or relate to the form in
which the intervention is delivered. Most qualifiers are based
on the size of the externality as it relates to a country’s
specific situation, in particular for CDs, where the large
externality only applies to endemic countries. Qualifiers
were also recorded when an intervention could not be clearly
classified as CE, in particular when CE estimates were
calculated on restricted samples and/or were difficult to
transfer to other areas.
Beyond CGH, we identified some interventions worth
highlighting for consideration by other sectors or in cross-
sectoral funding based on large external benefits generated
in sectors outside of health and not considered in the CE
denominator (a “DALYs-saved” metric). Examples of
externalities outside health include labor market/trade
effects, environmental externalities, rural development issues
(through outreach), security, and population externalities.
(Population externalities include creating an environment
conducive to child-bearing or/and population control, an
area that is strongly connected to the health sector.)
Treatment of externalities beyond the health system lies
outside the scope of this paper, but may be an important
contextual factor to consider alongside CE evidence. Lo and
colleague’s paper in this series highlights connections
between health and the environment that illustrate some of
the issues raised when there are cross-sectoral externalities.14
Results
Overall, we find that 62 (70%) of the 88 interventions
recommended by DCP3 for public funding based on CE
are public goods or may generate large benefits beyond the
recipient of the intervention. They are therefore potentially
designated as CGH, although only seven of these qualify
unconditionally in all contexts and forms (see Table A1 in
online supplement for a list of designated interventions). The
remaining 26 interventions (30%) are clearly not CGH, and
so public funding for these interventions should be examined
solely on individual welfare/equity considerations.
By disease category: More than one-half of the interven-
tions listed in the DCP3 CE list concern CDs, about 30%
concern NCDs and 15% are specifically directed to maternal
and child health (MCH) (see Table 2). A large majority
(80%) of interventions that were designated potential CGH
are for CD interventions. Most of these CD interventions
were placed in the conditional category with restrictions,
generally based on epidemiological factors that determine
the size of the externality in a given country at a given
time. All interventions under this category qualify as CGH
in endemic countries or in emergency response situations.
Notable interventions that passed the CGH test for NCDs
include legislation/regulation and other control activities
related to tobacco, food ads, and labeling, and the develop-
ment of protocols and guidelines to promote the prevention
of hypertension and heart disease. In the MCH category,
CGH interventions include the development of guidelines
and kits, knowledge development (training and education
programs), and hygiene and nutrition activities.
By health function. Table 3 shows interventions orga-
nized by Essential Public Health Operations (EPHO) as
produced by WHO for the European region in 2014.36 The
EPHO framework is more detailed than the one used in
Table 1 as it separates service delivery functions from the
intelligence and enabling functions; the latter two cate-
gories are most likely to include public goods as defined
in this paper. Out of the 26 interventions in the DCP3 that
Total in
DCP3 CE
list
Cost-
effective
CGH
CGH with
qualifiers
(a)
Clearly
not
CGH
Communicable
Diseases (b)
49 3 46 0
Mother and Child
Health
(specific)
13 3 5 5
Non-
Communicable
Diseases
26 1 4 21
(a)All types of qualifiers are considered including those linked to CE estimates. The
category includes 19 CD interventions that are cost-effective CGH in endemic
countries only (without other qualifiers).
(b)Interventions to prevent mother-to-child transmission of CDs are included in CDs.
TABLE 2. CGHs in the DCP32 List of Cost-Effective Interventions
by Broad Disease Categories
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clearly did not qualify as CGH, 16 were related to treat-
ment and therefore also do not fit into EPHO categories,
while 10 included some element of prevention. As
described above, over half of the interventions considered
included some aspect of disease prevention and 70% were
designated CGH with some qualifiers. We note the
absence of obvious CGH in the DCP3 list, in particular
in Intelligence functions (Surveillance and Monitoring,
Preparedness & Response) and Enablers (particularly
Governance activities). This is due in part to the fact that
the CE list depends on the types of interventions chosen
for conducting CEA in the first place. Given the cost of
CEA studies, they are not usually considered necessary for
either obvious public goods or activities that are tradition-
ally financed in the public health sector. Nevertheless, the
lack of CEA studies does not fully explain their absence,
particularly if we consider that the longer list of essential
UHC interventions in chapter 3 of the DCP3, which is not
limited to those for which CE estimates are available, is
also dominated by service delivery interventions.2
By income group. Given the limited funds available in
LICs, it is often not feasible to fund all interventions that
would be cost-effective in higher income countries. As
explained earlier, an intervention is CE in a specific country
setting only if its cost-effectiveness ratio lies on or below
that country’s CE threshold. Out of the 62 interventions that
we found to be potentially cost-effective CGH, 7 are highly
unlikely to qualify as CE in LMICs and another 8 (making
a total of 15) may not qualify in LICs based on income-
group-specific CE thresholds. Examples of interventions
that qualify as CGH in higher income countries but may
not be recommended for implementation in LMICs based
on income-specific CE thresholds are: vector control inter-
ventions for Dengue, online sex education to prevent sexu-
ally transmitted infections, and water supply/sanitation.
Caveats and Lessons from the Exercise
Going through the list of specific interventions revealed that
CGH boundaries are not always clear-cut. Classification
difficulties can take a number of forms:
● uncertainty about the size of the externality;
● uncertainty about the nature of the externality, in particu-
lar, whether or not it principally affects the health sector;
● imprecision regarding the nature of the intervention, in
particular in cases when a public good response could
fully or partially resolve a market failure;
● uncertainty about secondary effects, in particular when
public policy may disrupt partial provision through
markets; and,
● uncertainties regarding cost-effectiveness.
Some of these uncertainties can be resolved only when the
precise setting of the intervention is known. As this is an
exploratory and illustrative paper, we have taken a pragmatic
approach wherever necessary. However, some of these issues
could be worth exploring further in subsequent work in order
to delineate tighter boundaries for CGH.
Total in DCP3
CE list (a)
Cost effective
CGH
CGH with
qualifiers (b)
Clearly not
CGH
Core Functions Intelligence EPHO-1: Surveillance 0 n/a n/a n/a
EPHO-2: Monitoring,
Preparedness & Response
0 n/a n/a n/a
Service Delivery EPHO-3: Protection 19 4 15 0
EPHO-4: Promotion 14 2 12 0
EPHO-5: Disease Prevention 56 6 40 10
Enablers EPHO-6: Governance 0 n/a n/a n/a
EPHO-7: Workforce 2 1 1 0
EPHO-8: Funding 0 n/a n/a n/a
EPHO-9: Communication 1 0 1 0
EPHO-10: Research 1 1 0 0
Not EPHO Health Care 20 0 2 18
(a) One intervention may include elements that fit under multiple categories, explaining why totals exceed 88. Interventions classified as prevention include tertiary prevention that
generally did not qualify as CGH.
(b) All types of qualifiers are considered, including those linked to CE estimates.
TABLE 3. CGHs in the DCP32 List of Cost-Effective Interventions by EPHO Health Functions36
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Furthermore, as noted earlier, there may be many CGH
that should be on our list but which are excluded for lack of
CE data. Given the difficulty of measuring benefits for
public goods and in cases of health externalities affecting
large numbers of people, it is expected that CGH interven-
tions are excluded simply because there is currently no
relevant evidence on their cost-effectiveness.
Despite such grey areas, this exercise revealed that:
● CGH can indeed be found outside of CD control
activities;
● most direct health-care-related activities remain outside
the realm of CGH;
● for many non-CGH activities suffering from market
failure, there exist CGH interventions that can remove
the source of failure without recourse to direct provi-
sion/ﬁnancing of the activity by the government;
● the context is important to determine whether an inter-
vention is CGH or not (for example, CE is likely dif-
ferent depending on whether a disease is endemic in
a country, whether the intervention occurs in an emer-
gency response situation, and whether the country is
severely resource-constrained);
● CE intervention lists cannot provide a comprehensive
list of recommended CGH; and,
● many cost-effective interventions are not CGH.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
The Musgrove decision tree acknowledges that CGH are
not the only areas in which public funding of healthcare
secures welfare gains. However, the collective nature of
such goods and services means that citizens and politicians
may not fully appreciate the extent of the benefits they
offer. CGH are especially vulnerable to being given low
priority compared with health-care interventions for which
the benefits are largely confined to the individual receiving
the service. Yet by definition, CGH interventions generate
large social benefits with strong potential impact on
human health. Goods that are non-rival in consumption
(such as disease surveillance) may generate such large
impacts because the number of people who benefit from
the intervention is large. Likewise, if social externalities
are extensive, benefits may extend to large numbers of
people beyond immediate consumers of the good or
service.
Subject to the availability of relevant evidence, and pro-
vided that health benefits can be estimated across the whole
population (beyond those directly receiving the intervention),
CGH can be assessed using the same CEA criterion as is
frequently applied to more personal health services.
However, many potential CGH have not yet been subject to
adequate CEA, and the existing lists of recommended inter-
ventions based on published CE estimates may in part be
responsible for under-provision of CGH.
Although we have advocated the use of CEA for asses-
sing CGH, it must be acknowledged that calculating CE
metrics for CGH may be especially challenging given that
the benefits of CGH are likely to be distributed across
a large population and difficult to measure. For example,
the incremental costs and health improvement associated
with infectious disease control interventions will be highly
dependent on local epidemiology, existing health services
infrastructure, and context. Calculating such effects
requires country-specific analyses; generating these may
be an important role for donors and global health agen-
cies. Furthermore, many CGH interventions, such as redu-
cing risk factors for NCDs, may have long-term impacts
across a wide range of diseases, introducing further meth-
odological challenges. Increasing capacity for undertaking
CEA for CGH should, therefore, be a high priority in
LMICs.
Even if they are deemed cost-effective, many CGH
involve considerable up-front investments in new infrastruc-
ture, information systems, service delivery platforms, and/or
workforce training. These investment costs should in princi-
ple be amortized over the expected lifetime of the interven-
tion; in practice, however, they may be a serious institutional
constraint to implementation. Again, the funding of invest-
ment costs may be an important role for international donors.
Finally, this paper does not consider the political failure
aspect of CGH funding; the issue of government failure in
relation to CGH is discussed in the paper by Bump and
colleagues in this special issue.37 In fact, we have implicitly
assumed that government intervention is capable of generat-
ing optimal allocations. Nevertheless, one needs to consider
that market failures themselves may be an important reason
for political failures. Politicians may not feel popular pres-
sure to invest in CGH because voters do not perceive the
benefits of CGH as clearly when compared to those of
personal health services. This lack of pressure can be attrib-
uted in large part to the same causes of market failure
discussed above, public goods and externalities. Thus, the
market failures and political failures may be intimately
linked.
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We conclude by stressing that health ministries need to
take full account of market failures when arguing for CGH
funding. We have in this paper sought to examine the nature
of those market failures, and to demonstrate how economic
principles can be used to identify and prioritize CGH. We
have further argued that CEA can be a powerful instrument
for demonstrating the value of CGH, just as it is for personal
health services. While we recognize that evidence resources
in this domain are scarce, they are increasing, and we hope
that the prominence given to CGH in this series will stimu-
late the strengthening of that research base.
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Notes
[a] Social optimality in economics is understood to be attained when
social welfare—the sum of all benefits to all—is optimized given
resource constraints, technology, and individual preferences. Social
welfare maximization often assumes equal weight for all individuals
and costless redistribution.
[b] The classification of goods into rival and non-rival—or at least, the
theoretical exposition of optimal provision of such goods—is attrib-
uted to Samuelson, while the criterion of being excludable or not is
attributed to Musgrave.9-11 The exposition combining the two criteria
was first proposed by R. and P. Musgrave.3 Although there are rarely
credited for it, their four-way matrix has been widely reproduced and
tweaked in the literature and economics textbooks.
[c] Conversely, the tree reveals that an activity that is both rival and exclud-
able should not be financed with public funds if the beneficiaries are not
poor, as long there are no significant externalities and no risk of indivi-
duals falling into poverty due to catastrophic costs.
[d] Given that there is considerable uncertainty in the range of CE estimates
obtained for a given type of intervention, point estimates are not
generally used to prioritize across interventions with CE estimates that
are relatively close. The same framework can be used when grouping
interventions that are not sufficiently differentiated by CE results.
[e] Examples of interventions with comparators other than “do nothing”
include: treat severe malaria with artesunate vs. quinine; ACE inhibi-
tor vs. no medication, heart failure, with access to treatment;
Prevention of Mother-To-Child Transmission (PMTCT) Option
B HIV vs. Option A, Africa; and, PMTCT Option B HIV vs. no
treatment, Africa.
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